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Since the seminal works of Malthus and Boserup, scientists have long debated the impact of population
growth and land constraints on the wellbeing of rural people. Today these concerns are particularly rel-
evant to Africa, with its rapid population growth, very small farms, and chronic food insecurity. In this
paper we examine adaptation to falling land-labor ratios using a comprehensive theoretical framework
in which households faced with binding land constraints can respond in three ways: intensifying agricul-
tural production, diversifying out of agriculture, and reducing fertility rates. Using cross-country data and
drawing upon the existing literature, we reach three conclusions. First, population density is associated
with reduced fallows and more intensive use of land but not fertilizer use or irrigation, indicating major
challenges in achieving sustainable intensiﬁcation or agricultural productivity growth. Second, there is
little evidence of successful non-farm diversiﬁcation in response to land pressures in Africa from domes-
tic or international income sources. Third, rural Africans in land constrained countries desire smaller fam-
ilies, but have thus far beneﬁted little from family planning policies. These ﬁndings underscore the need
for a coordinated multi-sectoral approach to sustainably reduce poverty in the region.
 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).‘‘The potential problems of declining labor productivity and envi-
ronmental degradation are not problems of levels of population
densities. Given sufﬁcient time, it is likely that a combination of
farmer inventions, savings, and the development of research insti-
tutions... will be able to accommodate much more than the current
population in most countries... However, if all of these changes are
required quickly and simultaneously because of rapid population
growth rates, they may emerge at too slow a pace to prevent a
decline in human welfare.’’
[p. 51 of Pingali and Binswanger (1988)]Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Malthus (1798), the relationship
between demography and agricultural development has been the
subject of important research in a number of literatures. Following
Boserup (1965), the literature in the 1980s and early 1990s focused
on testing the important prediction that rising population density
in rural areas induces farmers to intensify agricultural production
(Binswanger and McIntire, 1987; Binswanger and Rosenzweig,1986; Lele and Stone, 1989; Pingali et al., 1987; Pingali and
Binswanger, 1988; Ruthenberg, 1980; Turner et al., 1993). In the
1990s research in this area gradually shifted to assessing the
implications of rural population growth for natural resource degra-
dation (Bilsborrow, 1992; Carswell, 1997; Clay and Reardon, 1998;
Krautkraemer, 1994; Mortimore, 1993; Pingali, 1990; Scherr, 1999;
Tiffen, 1995). And since the Green Revolution successes in Asia,
there has emerged a more generic literature on intensiﬁcation
and technology adoption (Diao et al., 2008; Djurfeldt et al., 2005;
Evenson, 2004; Evenson and Gollin, 2003a,b; Hazell, 2009;
Johnson et al., 2003; Mosley, 2002), with population pressures
being treated as an underlying theme.
Despite some important research on the linkages between
demography, land availability and agricultural development, the
recent development literature has rarely revisited or extended
the theory and evidence that emerged in earlier decades. This
knowledge gap persists despite renewed concerns that rapid rural
population growth – particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter
Africa or SSA) – could have potentially disastrous consequences
on rural welfare and food security (Lipton, 2009, 2012). Indeed, it
could be argued that population pressures pose a far more severe
challenge for African agriculture than the related threat of adverse
climate change. For while the magnitude and impacts of climate
change remain very uncertain, rapid population growth in Africa
will be inevitable for many decades to come, and in many large
Table 1
Rural population patterns and trends, 2010. Source: Authors’ construction from FAO (2012) data for the year 2010.
# Population densitya Rural population (millions)
2010 2010 2050 Change
Africa 41 117 505 810 305
High density Africab 12 172 294 457 163
Low density Africab 29 49 211 353 142
South Asia 7 528 1132 1120 12
East Asia 9 199 975 524 452
Middle East & North Africa 10 506 157 159 2
Eastern Europe, Central Asia 21 58 98 75 22
Latin America 21 53 125 100 24
a Notes: Rural population density is the estimated rural population divided by land devoted to arable land and permanent crops.
b High density Africa consists of countries with rural population densities in excess of 100 people per square kilometer. This includes Rwanda (420 people per sq. km),
Burundi (339), Comoros (309), Malawi (209), Uganda (201), Ethiopia (194), DRC (187), Benin (152), Kenya (113), Gambia (108), Nigeria 106), and Sierra Leone (104).
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strained land resources.
Tables 1 and 2 motivate this concern. Table 1 reports estimates
of rural population density (deﬁned as the rural population relative
to total crop land), and projections of rural population growth for
the developing world.1 While rural population density in Africa is
still relatively low on average, twelve African countries constitute
a high density group with rural population densities above 100 peo-
ple per square kilometer. Moreover, this list includes Africa’s three
largest countries (Nigeria, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of
Congo),2 and a number of other large African countries (Uganda,
Kenya, Malawi), which collectively amount to 58% of sub-Saharan
Africa’s rural population. 2 reports both FAOSTAT and census/survey
data showing that farm sizes in these high density countries declined
sharply from the 1970s to the 2000s. Evidence on declining farm size
for a number of speciﬁc African countries over the same period is
presented in Jayne et al. (2003). The census/survey data suggest that
over this 30-year period the average landholding in high density
Africa declined from about 2 hectares to 1.2 hectares, on average,
but stayed the same in low density Africa. On top of this trend of
declining farm sizes in high density Africa, the rural populations of
these countries are expected to increase by a further 163 million
people in the next 40 years (Table 1).3 Low density rural Africa will
also face a substantial surge in its rural population of some 142 mil-
lion people, but in theory could cope with this pressure through land
expansion.4 And in stark contrast to Africa, rural populations in the
rest of the developing world are actually expected to have declined
by 2050.
The retrospective and prospective statistics in Tables 1 and 2
point to what is potentially a very disturbing scenario: rapid
population growth taking place amidst already declining land1 We will discuss our operational deﬁnitions of population density further below,
but we note here that if we want density measures that are good proxies for ‘‘land
pressures’’, then using total land area or even total agricultural area (including
livestock grazing area) is not very desirable. Much non-agricultural or livestock area is
very sparsely populated, meaning that countries with populations heavily clustered in
cropping areas but with extensive non-crop areas would appear land abundant. Egypt
– with 100% of its cropland irrigated, and almost all of the non-cropland area being
desert – is an extreme example, but Ethiopia, Kenya and other African countries share
this characteristic of population clustering in areas of good cropping potential.
2 Data for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are notoriously sketchy, and it is
indeed surprising that farm sizes and land per capita are so small in such a land
abundant country. We therefore consider the DRC a very borderline case. On the other
hand there are counties like Madagascar which the FAO data suggests is land
abundant, despite average farm sizes of under 1 hectare. Thus the classiﬁcation of
high and low density does indeed depend on which indicator or data source is used.
3 These estimates may be conservative for several reasons. First, they assume a size
reduction in fertility rates, which has thus far been sluggish in much of Africa,
particularly the DRC. Second, they assume reasonably rapid urbanization, which is
often exaggerated in Africa (Potts, 2012).
4 See Chamberlain et al. (2014) for more analysis of the constraints land expansion.endowments in high-density African countries, which are already
typiﬁed by severe rural poverty. Faced with that pressure, it is
surely crucial to ask whether and how rural Africans are adapting
to rising land constraints, and to consider the potential implica-
tions for Africa’s development strategies, which may be wide rang-
ing and multisectoral.
To address these questions, we ﬁrst integrate prior strands of
the literature into a single framework that identiﬁes the distinct
means by which rural people (and their governments) may adapt
to or mitigate emerging pressures on agricultural land (Sec-
tion ‘Theoretical and methodological frameworks’). Our starting
point is an agrarian economy with farm income per capita as the
key welfare variable. A simple disaggregation of farm income per
capita demonstrates three possible means of responding to rapid
rural population growth under binding land constraints5: (1)
growth in the value of farm output per hectare (agricultural intensi-
ﬁcation); (2) exits from the farm sector to rural nonfarm, urban or
overseas labor markets; and (3) reductions in rural fertility rates.
Of note is that the vast majority of the existing literature on popula-
tion pressures has focused on the need to transition from land
expansion to land intensiﬁcation, with fertility reductions and non-
farm diversiﬁcation being largely the subject of very separate litera-
tures on demography, the rural nonfarm economy and migration.
Empirically, we focus on the big picture by examining cross-
country patterns and trends in available data. We also conduct
cross-country tests of the strength of responses to changes in pop-
ulation density, occasionally augmenting our own analysis with
ﬁndings from the existing literature. While cross-country analysis
has well known limitations – particularly causal identiﬁcation
(Durlauf et al., 2005) – a multi-country empirical analysis has the
potential scope to add external validity to some of the country-
speciﬁc conclusions generated in the more detailed case studies
contained in this special issue, and in the existing literature (e.g.
Pender et al., 2006), or to identify new stylized facts worthy of fur-
ther research (Pritchett, 2001). To these ends, Sections ‘Agricultural
intensiﬁcation’, ‘Nonfarm diversiﬁcation’, and ‘Reducing rural fer-
tility rates’ explore the three different means of responding to land
constraints using an unusually large and rich set of data on rural
demography and farm sizes, agricultural inputs and production,
rural fertility rates and income diversiﬁcation indicators. The
strengths and weaknesses of our data and techniques are discussed
in more detail in Appendix A.
While a more detailed summary of our results is provided in our
concluding section (Section ‘Conclusions’), we note here the
study’s three main conclusions.5 A companion paper in this special consider the scope for land expansion and
rural-to-rural migration. See Chamberlain et al. (2013).
Table 2
Alternative indicators of land endowments in developing regions, 1970s and 2000s. Sources: Hectares per capita are derived from FAO (2012) population and crop land estimates,
where crop land is arable land plus permanent crop land. Hectares per holder are principally drawn from FAOWorld Census of Agriculture data from 1996 to 2005 and augmented
by the authors with results from various household surveys (mostly for 2005–2010). Gini coefﬁcients of land inequality are calculated by the authors from these sources.
Region Period Hectares per ag. worker (FAO) Hectares per rural capita (FAO) Hectares per holding (surveys) Farmland Gini coef. (Gini, 0–1)a
Africa – high densityb 1970s 0.84 0.35 1.99
(n = 5) 2000s 0.58 0.25 1.23 0.46
Africa – low densityb 1970s 1.65 0.64 2.65
(n = 11) 2000s 1.37 0.53 2.82 0.53
South Asia 1970s 0.78 0.22 2.01
(n = 5) 2000s 0.55 0.15 1.19 0.53
China & S.E. Asia 1970s 0.80 0.30 2.08
(n = 4) 2000s 0.68 0.28 1.58 0.55
Middle East 1970s 5.52 1.02 9.86
(n = 6) 2000s 7.44 0.83 5.62 0.65
North Africa 1970s 3.60 0.74 6.90
(n = 4) 2000s 3.10 0.72 6.35 0.61
Central America 1970s 2.13 0.57 28.78
(n = 7) 2000s 2.44 0.56 14.83 0.76
South America 1970s 5.67 1.77 112.59
(n = 9) 2000s 5.42 2.43 140.86 0.85
a Notes: Farm inequality refers to Gini coefﬁcient of land holdings, but since fewer observations were available for this indicator so we simply report an average over time.
b ‘‘Africa-low density’’ includes Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo and Zambia. ‘‘Africa-high density’’ includes
Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda and Uganda.
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Boserup, Binswanger and others certainly receive very strong sup-
port from the data for both African and non-African samples, but
with several important exceptions. One of those is the lower
responsiveness of fertilizer use to land constraints in Africa. An
existing literature links this to a vicious circle of over-exploitation
of land, a resultant process of nutrient mining and loss of soil
organic matter, and further reductions in the returns to fertilizer
use. A second exception is Africa’s much lower use of – and
potential for – irrigation. Irrigation was clearly an essential com-
ponent of Asian countries being able to feed themselves and
reduce poverty. The true potential for irrigation in Africa is still
unclear, but irrigation expansion in Africa will not be the ‘‘low
hanging fruit’’ that it was in Asia. Africa’s low use of irrigation
also partially explains its weak response of fertilizer intensiﬁca-
tion to rising population density. Third, Africa’s greater diversity
of crops, its proliferation of small countries, and its historic
underinvestment in crop research, would all predict a more slug-
gish process of research, development and adoption of improved
seed varieties. These unique characteristics all suggest that, with-
out fundamental changes in the thrust of agricultural policies,
Africa has much less scope for sustained and sustainable small-
holder-led agricultural intensiﬁcation than Asia, and that increas-
ingly binding land constraints will be a major drag to poverty
reduction in the region, in the absence of non-farm income
drivers.
Yet our second ﬁnding of note is that nonfarm income drivers
are equally sluggish in Africa. Some high density countries have
large rural nonfarm sectors, but many do not. All African countries
have weak manufacturing bases, and are heavily reliant on job cre-
ation in low-return services activities. And while international
remittances data are patchy, it also appears that African countries
have not been as successful at tapping into overseas labor markets
as Asian countries.
Finally, we ﬁnd novel evidence that desired fertility rates in
rural areas decline in response to higher rates of population den-
sity, but achieved fertility rates do not. In other words, high density
countries in Africa face large gaps in unmet contraception needs,
suggesting that family planning policies would be more efﬁcacious
in these countries than in more land abundant regions. While some
land constrained African countries are more aggressively pursuingfamily planning policies (for example, Ethiopia), the importance of
these policies, and complementary policies targeted at increasing
women’s education and empowerment, is under-emphasized in
most policy discussions, as are the lessons from Asia’s far more
successful attempts to reduce fertility rates.
These pessimistic conclusions clearly raise cause for concern.
Many of these ﬁndings obviously link to existing concerns in sev-
eral different literatures, though rarely do previous studies piece
these different dimensions of the problem together. Rarer still is
explicit acknowledgement of the severity of land constraints in
policy discussions and processes in Africa, a region that is too often
labeled as land abundant. The most land-constrained countries in
Africa face a daunting combination of continued population pres-
sure, limited scope for agricultural intensiﬁcation, and a sluggish
industrialization process (Headey et al., 2010). Policymakers in
Africa urgently need to think through the most effective ways of
addressing these problems, and thereby catalyzing a more success-
ful economic transformation.Theoretical and methodological frameworks
As a departure point for understanding the relationship
between rural population density and household welfare, we con-
sider rural income per capita adopted as the welfare maximand of
principal interest (we drop country and time period subscripts for
the sake of simplicity). Aggregate income (Y) in a rural economy
can be derived from either farm income (subscript f) or nonfarm
income (subscript nf):
Y  Yf þ Ynf ð1Þ
In per capita terms (where N refers to the rural population),
income is the sum of the shares of labor in the farm and nonfarm
sector multiplied by each sector’s labor productivity.
Y
N
 hf Yf þ ð1 hf Þynf ;where hf ¼
Nf
N
; yf ¼
yf
Nf
and ynf ¼
ynf
Nnf
ð2Þ
In autarkic subsistence economies (the subject of Malthus’ and
Boserup’s analyses) the nonfarm sector is non-existent, such that
hf = 1 and all rural income is farm income (we will return to the
6 Previous analyses of Boserupian intensiﬁcation tended to use cross-sectiona
correlations between population densities and farming systems to draw strong
inferences, without explicitly recognizing the various challenges to drawing causa
inferences.
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decomposed into the product of farm income per hectares of land,
and per capita land endowments (L):
Yf
N
 Yf
L
 L
N
ð3Þ
Taking the log and ﬁrst differences, we observe that growth in
agricultural output per capita is the sum of growth in income per
hectare and growth in per capita land endowments.
D ln
Yf
N
 D lnYf
L
þ D ln L
N
ð4Þ
Since the land to population ratio is the reciprocal of agricul-
tural population density (d), growth in farm income can also be
expressed as growth in value per hectare less growth in agricul-
tural population density:
D ln
Yf
N
 lnYf
L
 D ln d ð5Þ
An alternative disaggregation shows that changes in average
farm income are the sum of changes in output per hectare and
changes in farm land, less agricultural population growth.
D ln
Yf
N
 D lnYf
L
 D ln L D lnN ð6Þ
Re-introducing a nonfarm sector, agricultural population
growth will be the sum of the percentage change in the net birth
rate (b, birth rates less death rates) and the net migration rate
out of agriculture, which is hf:
D lnN  D ln bþ D ln hf ð7Þ
Substituting (7) into (6) we obtain the following key identity:
D ln
Yf
N
 D lnYf
L
þ D ln L D lnb D ln hf ð8Þ
Whilst purely a decomposition, this identity is nevertheless
instructive insofar as it provides a description of the four possible
means of adapting to or mitigating agricultural land pressures:
(1) Land expansion (Dln L).
(2) Agricultural intensiﬁcation, deﬁned here as increases in agri-
cultural output (value) per hectare D ln YfL
 
.
(3) Reducing rural fertility rates (Dln b).
(4) Diversiﬁcation into nonfarm sectors (Dln hf), be it local,
urban or international.
It should also be apparent that different and often competing
theories of rural development are embedded in these equations.
For example, in Malthus’ theory, population growth and value
per hectare are exogenous, and land is in ﬁxed supply. These
assumptions predict a decline in farm income per capita as the
rural population expands, until induced higher mortality rates
check population growth. In Boserup’s hypothesis, however, agri-
cultural intensity is itself a function of land constraints. If ed is
the elasticity of agricultural value per hectare with respect to pop-
ulation density, then Eq. (5) can be expressed as:
D ln
Yf
N
¼ ðed  1ÞD ln d ð9Þ
Thus the impact of population density on farm income per
capita could be negative (ed < 1), zero (ed = 1), or conceivably even
positive (ed > 1). This magnitude clearly matters. If ed is zero or
close to zero, then Eq. (9) implies that net farm income per capita
declines almost proportionately to the decline in land per capita. If
ed is closer to 1, on the other hand, then the agricultural intensiﬁ-
cation response to declining farm sizes may be strong enoughalmost fully offset the loss of farming land. More generally, there
may be other factors exogenously raising agricultural output per
hectare, such as farm policies, and improved infrastructure and
market access conditions. And insofar as shrinking land-labor
ratios reduce farm labor requirements, we would also expect
reductions in desired fertility rates and increased demand for non-
farm labor employment. In effect then, each of the right hand side
terms in Eq. (8) could be a function of existing population density,
which is what much of this paper is focused on testing.
Finally, several other theories of development could be embod-
ied in this framework. The literature on Asia’s Green Revolution’s
emphasized policy-induced technical change as an antidote to ris-
ing land constraint and a complement to Boserupian intensiﬁca-
tion. A large literature on structural transformation, beginning
with Lewis (1954), emphasizes industrialization as an escape from
rural poverty, especially in surplus labor conditions.
The theoretical framework above suggests that various adaptive
behaviors may be causally affected by land pressures, measured
above as agricultural land per capita or its inverse, agricultural
population density. Whilst there is a substantial literature explor-
ing some of these relationships – particularly the relationship
between land pressures and agricultural intensiﬁcation – there
are some signiﬁcant (and under-discussed) methodological chal-
lenges to estimating the impact of land pressures on agricultural
intensiﬁcation and other adaptive behaviors.6
In terms of data, many of the variables referred to in the equa-
tions above are difﬁcult to measure. Appendix Table A1 outlines
our attempts to measure some of the adaptations to population
density, as well as relevant control variables. Consistent with the
equations above we measure population density as the agricultural
population (those saying they rely primarily on agricultural
income) relative to total cropland. One might argue that poten-
tially arable cropland should be used in the denominator, but mea-
surement of this is hardly straightforward, particularly the
measurement of land with economic potential for cropping
(Young, 1999; Chamberlain et al. 2014). In Africa these are partic-
ularly important issues. For example, while we know that there are
immense tracts of land in the DRC and Madagascar with some
potential for cropping, farm census data of the type shown in
Table 2 suggest that average farm holdings in these countries are
below 1 hectare, suggesting that farmers in these countries do face
constraints on land expansion, even if these constraints are not
purely physical.
In econometric terms, there are a number of reasons why
endogeneity issues might pervade any attempts to explore the
relationships examined above. For example, population density
and agricultural intensiﬁcation are clearly simultaneously
inﬂuenced by agroecological potential, access to markets and other
policies. Similarly, serial correlation in time series variables can
create important estimation problems. A disadvantage of the
cross-country data used herein is that there are serious challenges
to identifying strictly causal relationships. Data constraints leave
us with small samples and very few indicators of key policy vari-
ables that we would ideally want to control for. And there are also
no obvious instruments for changes in rural population density,
since it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd reported indicators that inﬂuence popu-
lation growth but are unlikely to inﬂuence farming practices or
nonfarm diversiﬁcation.
The empirical results in this paper therefore only make for sug-
gestive causal inferences. Where possible we try to account for
obvious biases (for example, removing ﬁxed effects through ﬁrstl
l
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relationships discussed below warrant further empirical testing.
More rigorous tests are indeed conducted in many of the country
case studies in this special issue. Others warrant future research.9 In principal we should measure cereal area harvested multiple times to cereal
rea harvested at least once in the last 5 years. This was not possible for the bulk of
ur sample, but correlations between the two indicators for subsamples were very
igh (in excess of 0.9). Even so, the indicator is surely measured with substantial
rror, though the broad patterns across countries are plausible.
0 We considered alternative indicators of land constraints, but all seemed to suffer
om more serious ﬂaws that this indicator. For example, one could measure the rural
opulation per area of land, but this might include nonfarm populations that have
ttle interest in farming. As it happens the rural and agricultural population densitiesAgricultural intensiﬁcation
Boserup (1965) is regarded as the original proponent of the idea
that as rural population density increases and land constraints
become binding, farming households gradually switch from an
extensive production system (where land is continually expanded
or infrequently rotated) to more intensive systems in which the
diminished availability of land is substituted by other inputs. At
early stages of this evolution, intensiﬁcation may simply involve
a reduction in the period in which land is left fallow. As fallow land
is increasingly exhausted, however, the substitution to non-land
inputs accelerates, including substitutions of labor effort, fertilizers
(initially organic, and then chemical), pesticides/herbicides,
traction (animal, and then machine), land structures (e.g. terraces),
increased use of water control techniques (irrigation), and
increased cropping intensity. While Boserup’s theory was the most
well developed and extensive statement of the evolution of farm-
ing systems at that time, it is also worth noting that 140 years ear-
lier von Thünen (1826) derived a related hypothesis that proximity
to markets (towns and cities) also induces a switch to higher value
commodities, in order to increase the value per hectare, which
could also be regarded as a form of intensiﬁcation.7
In the 1980s, Binswanger, Pingali and others extended the
theoretical and empirical analysis of agricultural intensiﬁcation
(Binswanger and McIntire, 1987; Binswanger and Rosenzweig,
1986; Lele and Stone, 1989; Pingali et al., 1987; Pingali and
Binswanger, 1988; Ruthenberg, 1980; Ruttan and Hayami, 1984;
Ruttan and Thirtle, 1989).8 While the insights from this literature
are vast, we emphasize three important hypotheses.
First, while the Boserupian intensiﬁcation process generally
holds, ‘‘material’’ determinants (i.e. agroecological factors) can
substantially inﬂuence the form and speed of intensiﬁcation.
Animal traction may be a highly effective substitution for labor
effort in many areas, but may be inhibited by the disease environ-
ment (e.g. Tsetse ﬂy) in other areas. In some countries we also
observe high degrees of cereal intensiﬁcation (e.g. Bangladesh),
but in other regions high density areas specialize in cash crops
(e.g. coffee in the East African highlands).
Second, access to both domestic and foreign markets can drive
agricultural intensiﬁcation even in the absence of greater popula-
tion density (in effect, an extension of von Thünen’s hypothesis).
That said, market access may inﬂuence the form of intensiﬁcation,
and may also interact with agroecological conditions. For example,
proximity to cities may encourage the production of high value
perishable commodities, but non-perishable cash crops can be
grown in conditions of relatively poor market access.
Third, there is no guarantee that rapid population growth – of
the kind seen in developing regions over the last century or so –
will automatically induce agricultural intensiﬁcation. Subsequent
research raised analogous concerns about the impact of rapid
population growth on environmental sustainability of agricultural
production, or ‘‘involution’’ instead of evolution ⁄⁄(Bilsborrow,
1992; Carswell, 1997; Clay and Reardon, 1998; Krautkraemer,
1994; Lele and Stone, 1989; Mortimore, 1993; Pingali, 1990;7 Moreover, both Boserup and von Thünen focused considerable attention on the
increasing value of land (and formalization of land markets) as population density or
proximity to markets increases. However, that implication is not directly testable
with the cross-country data used here.
8 The induced innovation hypothesis of Ruttan and Hayami (1984) can also be
thought of as a more general theory of farmers’ adaptation to changing endowments.Sanchez, 1998, 2002; Scherr, 1999; Tiffen, 1995). In this regard,
policy-induced intensiﬁcation may be an important means of
‘‘nudging’’ endogenous Boserupian intensiﬁcation, especially in
high density areas where there is latent demand for more intensive
technologies (Binswanger and Pingali (1988). Johnson (2000),
Djurfeldt et al. (2005) and Binswanger and Deininger (1997) all
suggest that rising population density may itself induce policy
responses. Rising population densities not only create scope for
large-scale food crises, they also lower the transaction costs of
form effective rural lobby groups.
Given these caveats and nuances, what do international data
tell us about the intensiﬁcation paths of small-farm developing
countries? In Tables 3–5, and Figs. 1 and 2, we explore trends in
various intensiﬁcation indicators for the three regions with perva-
sively small farm sizes, as demonstrated in Table 2: sub-Saharan
Africa (high and low density), South Asia and East Asia. The indica-
tors of intensiﬁcation we use are all derived from FAO (2012) data,
and are described in more detail in Appendix Table A1. Some of
these indicators are standard (cereal yields, crop and agricultural
output per hectare, fertilizer (nitrogen) use per hectare), but others
deserve further explanation. For example, in line with Boserupian
literature we constructed a basic indicator of cereal cropping
intensity. The numerator of this ratio is cereal area harvested in a
given year (potentially multiple times), while the denominator is
temporary crop area harvested at least once in the last ﬁve years.
This indicator is therefore a close approximation of Ruthenberg’s
(1980) R-index.9 We also focus on non-land capital per hectare as
an aggregate measure of intensiﬁcation, as well as cattle/oxen per
hectare. The latter is discussed extensively as an intensiﬁcation indi-
cator in Binswanger and Pingali (1988). We also consider both high
value non-cereal crops (e.g. coffee) and non-cereal staples, such as
cassava, as a potentially important form of intensiﬁcation. Finally,
we measure our latent variables, ‘‘land constraints’’, with the agricul-
tural population per square kilometer of agricultural land.10 In terms
of analytics we focus on longer run trends in these indicators, but we
also run somewhat more formal econometric tests to derive point
estimates of the elasticities between population density and these
intensiﬁcation indicators. These tests rely on ﬁrst differenced esti-
mates of 10 year changes in intensiﬁcation against 10-year changes
in population density. We also note that a much broader array of
tests is available upon request.
We begin by focusing in Fig. 1, which shows LOWESS predicts of
the gradients between crop output (or value) per hectare and agri-
cultural population density in 1977 and 2007, for African and Asian
sub-samples. Crop output per hectare is important as perhaps the
most comprehensive indicator of intensiﬁcation, and one that is
welfare-relevant in that it is a strong predictor of household
income, holding farm sizes and rural nonfarm income constant.
The ﬁgure demonstrates several striking stylized facts. First, we
again observe that Asia has a much broader range of populationre very highly correlated anyway. Or one could use alternative measures of land in
e denominator, such as cropland land (but this may exclude pastoral areas that are
otentially usable for cropping) or potentially cultivable land (but this indicator
ems very weakly correlated with average farm size data from censuses and
rveys). None of these indicators are ideal, and we did explore sensitivity to some of
ur econometric results. In general we obtain similar point estimates when using
ese different indicators of land constraints, but the standard errors are sometimes
ﬂated to the point of rendering the elasticities insigniﬁcantly different from zero.a
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Table 3
Trends in various indicators of agricultural intensiﬁcation for four small-farm developing regions: 1977–2007. Source: All variables are constructed from FAO (2012) data.
Indicatorsb> Ag. Pop.
density (per
km2)
Cropping
intensity (%)
Cereal
yields (Hg/
Ha)
Total crop
value per Ha
($)
Cattle & oxen
per 1000 Ha
Non-cereal
output share
(%)
Irrigated
cropland (%)
Nitrogen
(kg) per Ha
Non-land
capital ($) per
Ha
East & South 1977 242.4 97.4 13917 661.2 463.3 43.6 10.9 23.0 1.6
East Asia 2007 205.0 116.8 29622 1348.4 623.9 50.4 19.3 94.3 2.5
Change (%) 15.4 19.9 112.8 103.9 34.7 15.6 76.6 309.3 61.7
South Asia 1977 358.1 100.7 12645 572.7 1645.1 40.6 23.2 21.5 2.4
2007 489.9 116.5 23452 1227.5 1965.8 44.7 43.0 82.8 3.2
Change (%) 36.8 15.7 85.5 114.3 19.5 10.1 85.0 285.3 33.4
Africa 1977 123.4 62.0 10614 398.3 324.0 55.9 0.2 2.0 0.9
Higher densitya 2007 180.8 77.8 13500 575.3 481.2 50.0 0.5 6.3 1.3
Change (%) 46.4 25.4 27.2 44.4 48.5 10.6 111.0 221.0 39.7
Africa 1977 32.6 55.8 7758 320.4 164.6 53.2 0.3 3.8 1.3
Low density 2007 40.6 61.7 10084 441.1 258.9 52.3 0.5 4.7 1.6
Change (%) 24.5 10.6 30.0 37.7 57.3 1.7 64.8 24.9 23.6
Notes: Statistics reported are the mean values across the set of countries in a given group.
a High density countries includes Benin, Burundi, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Togo, Sierra Leone and Uganda.
All have population densities exceeding 100 people per square km in 2007.
b All variables are described in the text.
Table 4
Sources of intensiﬁcation in Africa and Asia from the 1970s to the 2000s.
Period (1) Crop intensity (%) (2) Crop yields (3) Output per Ha Period (1) Crop intensity (%) (2) Crop yields (3) Output per Ha
Democratic Republic of Congo Bangladesh
1970s 59.1 607 359 1970s 131.9 569 751
2000s 77.0 584 450 2000s 153.9 1125 1731
Change (%) 30.3 3.7 25.5 Change (%) 16.7 97.5 130.5
Ethiopia China
1970s 53.2 291 155 1970s 137.2 693 951
2000s 89.7 421 378 2000s 109.3 2099 2294
Change (%) 68.7 44.7 144.0 Change (%) 20.3 202.8 141.2
Kenya India
1970s 60.9 356 217 1970s 97.0 397 385
2000s 71.7 354 254 2000s 102.2 804 822
Change (%) 17.7 0.5 17.1 Change (%) 5.4 102.5 113.4
Madagascar Indonesia
1970s 69.4 783 543 1970s 65.5 812 532
2000s 73.2 854 625 2000s 67.6 1617 1093
Change (%) 5.5 9.1 15.0 Change (%) 3.1 99.3 105.5
Malawi Nepal
1970s 96.7 348 337 1970s 119.8 435 521
2000s 99.4 635 631 2000s 175.1 745 1304
Change (%) 2.8 82.4 87.4 Change (%) 46.2 71.3 150.4
Nigeria Pakistan
1970s 74.8 412 308 1970s 82.2 415 341
2000s 109.0 727 792 2000s 100.0 766 766
Change (%) 45.7 76.5 157.2 Change (%) 21.7 84.6 124.6
Rwanda Philippines
1970s 91.2 847 772 1970s 121.0 675 817
2000s 114.3 835 955 2000s 117.9 1187 1399
Change (%) 25.4 1.4 23.7 Change (%) 2.5 75.8 71.3
Uganda Thailand
1970s 63.4 670 425 1970s 70.7 766 541
2000s 81.4 691 563 2000s 79.8 1519 1213
Change (%) 28.3 3.2 32.4 Change (%) 12.9 98.4 124.0
Africa (average of 8 countries above) Asia (average of 8 countries above)
1970s 71.1 539 389 1970s 103.2 595 605
2000s 89.5 638 581 2000s 113.2 1233 1328
Change (%) 28.0 26.3 62.8 Change (%) 10.4 104.0 120.1
Notes: (1) Crop intensity is area harvested multiple times in a year relative to area harvested at least once or under temporary fallow. (2) ‘‘Yields’’ is output per area harvested.
(3) Output per ha is the product of (1) and (2). See text for details.
D.D. Headey, T.S. Jayne / Food Policy 48 (2014) 18–33 23densities relative to Africa, although plenty of Asian and African
countries have similar densities. Second, there is a relatively gentle
positive gradient between population density and crop output per
hectare, which is at least consistent with the Boserup hypothesis.Third, Asia’s gradient has shifted in a parallel fashion upwards over
1977–2007. The size of the shift is just under 700 dollars per hect-
are, which is an approximate doubling of existing output in 1977.
Fourth, Africa’s gradient has scarcely shifted at all over 1977–2007.
Table 5
First difference estimates of the elasticities of intensiﬁcation variables with respect to agricultural population density in Africa and Asia. Sources: Author’s estimates from FAO
(2012) data.
Regression no. R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7
Dependent
variables
Non-land capital
per hectare
Cattle/oxen per
hectare
Nitrogen per
hectare
Cereal output per
hectare (yields)
Crop
intensity (%)
Non-cereal output per
hectare ($)
Total ag. output ($)
per hectare
African sample
Dln density 0.20* 0.38* 0.71 0.13 0.51* 0.50** 0.46**
(0.11) (0.21) (1.15) (0.25) (0.30) (0.20) (0.19)
# obs. 94 127 108 127 127 127 127
R-squared 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.06
Asian sample
Dln density 0.34 0.75*** 0.74* 0.53** 0.45*** 0.13 0.37*
(0.21) (0.27) (0.41) (0.23) (0.16) (0.31) (0.21)
# obs. 42 56 51 56 56 56 56
R-squared 0.10 0.23 0.56 0.12 0.29 0.12 0.13
Standard errors are in parentheses. These are robust regressions of the percentage change in the intensiﬁcation variables against the percentage change in agricultural
population density, with period effects, which are omitted for the sake of brevity. Data are structured as 10-year intervals from 1977 to 2007. See Table A1 for deﬁnitions of
variables.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
1 A caveat that warrants reiteration is that the FAO land and production estimates
re clearly measured with substantial error. The quality of national statistical systems
particularly weak in Africa, and largely dysfunctional in countries like the DRC. The
stimates in Table 4 are therefore quite speculative, and the more so for the African
sample.
24 D.D. Headey, T.S. Jayne / Food Policy 48 (2014) 18–33Together these facts would imply that while Boserupian intensiﬁ-
cation is important in the long run (as indicated by the positive
gradients), short run changes in intensiﬁcation mostly come about
from more exogenous drivers.
In Table 3 we turn to a broader range of intensiﬁcation indica-
tors and report levels and trends for the small-farm regions dis-
cussed in Table 2. The ﬁrst column reiterates the ﬁnding from
Table 2 that South Asia has much higher population densities than
high-density Africa, but high-density Africa’s population density
has nearly caught up to East and South-East Asia. In the second col-
umn we report trends in the indicator of cereal cropping intensity.
We ﬁnd that cropping intensity in the average high-density African
country has increased more rapidly than any other regional group-
ing over 1977–2007, by about 25%. In 2007 average crop intensity
in this group was about 78%, compared to 117% in the two Asian
regions. The next column shows that growth in cereal yields has
been much lower in both high and low density Africa, growing
by a paltry 30% from 1977 to 2007, compared to the approximate
doubling of yields in Asia. Total value per hectare grew slightly
quicker than cereal yields in Africa, but still far slower than Asia.
Consistent with the sluggish growth in output, input growth was
also slow with the exception of cattle/oxen per hectare. Most strik-
ingly, there was scarcely any sizeable expansion in irrigated area or
nitrogen application per hectare. And in contrast to Asia it appears
that the contribution of non-cereal crops to total output actually
declined somewhat in high density African countries.
The sluggish development of African agriculture is, of course, a
familiar result in the agricultural development literature, although
it is less often discussed in the context of Boserup’s theory. In
Table 4 we therefore explore Boserup’s hypothesis more deeply
by focusing on trends in cropping intensity, and its contribution
to overall intensiﬁcation, deﬁned as crop output per hectare. Crop
output (Yc) per hectare of arable and permanent cropland (L) is the
product of crop intensity (the ratio of area harvested, H, to arable
and permanent cropland, L) and ‘‘yields’’, where the latter is
deﬁned as the value of crop output (again Yc) per area harvested:
Yc
L
 H
L
 Yc
H
ð10Þ
This identity allows us to decompose growth in crop output per
hectare into growth in cropping area and growth in yields, which
we do for selected high density countries in Africa and Asia from
the 1970s to the 2000s (Table 4). The main result from Table 4 isthat increased cropping intensity appears to have driven about half
of the growth in crop output per hectare in high density African
countries. The contribution of increased cropping intensity to over-
all intensiﬁcation is particularly striking for Ethiopia, Nigeria, and
Congo (DRC). In these three most populous countries in Africa
increased cropping intensity seems to have been the main driver
of growth in output per hectare. In several other high density
countries one possible explanation of the lower contribution of
cropping intensity may be that initial levels were already high.
The data suggest that Malawi and Rwanda had cropping intensities
of close to unity even in the 1970s. And of course, for all these
countries there is scarcely much contribution of yields to increased
output per hectare.
This is a total contrast to the Asian countries in Table 4. In these
eight countries increased cropping intensity explains just 10% of
the total increase in output per hectare, with growth in yields
explaining the other 90%. Moreover, even in those countries where
there were reasonably sizeable contributions from cropping inten-
sity, these increases appear to be explained by expansion of irriga-
tion, as well as the development of high yielding varieties that
permitted multiple cropping (Bangladesh being a case in point).
Even so, in no Asian country did increased cropping intensity
contribute more than a mere fraction to growth in total crop out-
put per hectare.11
In Fig. 1 we link another worrying dimension to this kind of
intensiﬁcation path, namely the very low levels and low growth
rates of chemical fertilizer application. Fig. 1 plots nitrogen appli-
cation per hectare against cropping intensity for selected African
and Asian countries from the 1970s to 2009. In the three Asian
countries examined cropping intensity in 2009 is well above 80%,
but growth in cropping intensity was accommodated by expanded
nitrogen application. In contrast, African countries increased their
cropping intensity without applying more nutrients. This is
consistent with a literature linking population growth to nutrient
mining and loss of organic matter in Africa (Drechsel et al., 2001;
Stoorvogel et al., 1993; Tittonell and Giller, 2013; Marenya and
Barrett, 2009). This in turn is thought to create a vicious circle,
since land degradation could further constrain the returns to1
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Fig. 1. Crop output ($) per hectare and population density in African and Asian samples, 1977 and 2007. Notes: The ﬁtted curves are based on Lowess regressions. The
scatterplot refers to 2007 observations only. The three letter codes are World Bank country codes. See: <http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/wits/WITSHELP/Content/Codes/
Country_Codes.htm>. Sources: Both indicators are derived by the authors from FAO (2012) data. Crop output is measured in 2005 international dollars. Agricultural
population density is the number of people primarily dependent on agriculture per square kilometer of agricultural land.
Fig. 2. Cereal cropping intensity and fertilizer application. Notes: Cereal cropping
intensity is the ratio of area harvested (potentially several times) to the sum of area
cropped at least once plus area under temporary fallow. Source: Author’s estimates
from FAOSTAT (2013) data.
D.D. Headey, T.S. Jayne / Food Policy 48 (2014) 18–33 25fertilizer application and improved seeds, especially in the absence
of interventions to improve organic soil matter (Jayne and Rashid,
2013; Marenya and Barrett, 2009).12
In Table 5 we present somewhat more formal tests of intensiﬁ-
cation responses to rising population growth for small-farm coun-
tries in Africa and Asia. The results are based on ﬁrst differenced
models in which we regress the ﬁrst difference of the log of various
intensiﬁcation variables against the log of the ﬁrst difference of
agricultural population density, separately for Asian and African
samples.13 The estimated parameters are therefore scale-free elas-
ticities that allow comparison across the different intensiﬁcation
indicators. The data are structured as ﬁve decades for the years
1967, 1977, 1987, 1997 and 2007, though several of the variables12 Another major explanation of low fertilizer uptake in Africa is its high cos
relative to most other regions. In our data set, for example, we found a very close
inverse correlation between distance to ports and fertilizer use, consistent with
domestic transport costs being an important constraint on demand.
13 We also ran regressions in a pooled sample that used interaction terms with
African dummy variables. As expected given the size of the standard errors, the
density elasticities are never signiﬁcantly different between Asia and Africa, with the
exception of cereal yields, for which we ﬁnd that Africa has lower elasticities at the
10% level.
14 We do this chieﬂy because the annual data reported on FAOSTAT is somewha
illusory since most of the variables are not, in fact, measured annually (e.g. population
density). And while we use quite a large sample of developing countries, we exclude
small countries (less than 400,000 people in 1990), and also hyper-arid countries
unless they have 5% or more of their crop land irrigated.
15 In some of the case studies in this special issue there is some evidence that yields
are much higher in high density areas, although these results are based on cross-
sectional variation rather than changes in density over time.tare measured for shorter time periods.14 We also reemphasize the
caveats outlined in the previous section regarding causal inference.
In addition, the combination of small sample sizes, measurement
error and speciﬁcation errors does not permit us to estimate these
elasticities with much precision. So our conclusions from Table 5
must obviously be very cautious, and they clearly need to be backed
up by more rigorous and in-depth case studies, such as those pre-
sented in this special issue (Headey et al., 2014; Chamberlin et al.,
2014; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2014; Muyanga and Jayne, 2014).
Bearing these caveats in mind, what do these regressions tell us
about intensiﬁcation paths in Africa and Asia? Strikingly, most
intensiﬁcation variables seem signiﬁcantly responsive to increases
in agricultural population density, though the point estimates dif-
fer in magnitude across the regressions, and between the African
and Asian samples. Non-land capital per hectare is about as
responsive in Africa as Asia. In contrast to Table 3, cattle/oxen
per hectare looks somewhat more responsive to land pressures in
Asia than Africa. But consistent with Table 3, nitrogen per hectare
is only signiﬁcantly responsive to increasing population density in
the Asian sample. The point estimate for Africa is similar in magni-
tude, but the much larger standard error likely reﬂects the prob-
lems that almost all African countries have had in consistently
increasing fertilizer use. In Asia cereal yields appear to be highly
responsive to increasing population density, but in Africa this is
not the case, at least at the national level.15 In contrast to yields,
cereal cropping intensity appears equally responsive in Africa as
Asia. In Africa non-cereal crop output per hectare rises signiﬁcantly
with population density, whereas there is much less effect in Asia.
However, the data are not disaggregated enough to tell us which
types of crops drive this effect in Africa. In much of the high density
East African highlands there are indeed strong forms of non-cereal
intensiﬁcation in terms of cash crops like coffee and tea, but also sta-
ples like bananas, cassava and enset. Finally, agricultural output per
hectare appears to be equally responsive in Africa and Asia, witht
,
16 Speciﬁcally, for different DHS rounds in the same country we observed some
jumpiness in the data for RNFE employment shares seemingly pertaining to
reclassiﬁcations between domestic workers and sales workers. It may be the result
of women working part time or seasonally in sales work, such as roadside vending.
26 D.D. Headey, T.S. Jayne / Food Policy 48 (2014) 18–33point estimates of 0.46 in Africa and 0.37 in Asia. This suggests that
as farm sizes shrink by 1%, farm income per capita shrinks by more
than half, implying serious welfare losses unless more densely pop-
ulated regions can derive more income from nonfarm activities,
which is the question we turn to in the next section.
But before turning to that question, let us ﬁrst summarize some
salient differences between Africa’s intensiﬁcation path and Asia’s.
Our principal conclusion is that high density countries in Africa
have largely intensiﬁed via traditional technologies: by increasing
cropping intensity (and presumably unobservable labor inputs),
by using more cattle/oxen, and by increasing production of non-
cereals. The last of these claims is somewhat speculative, but we
do know that higher density areas rely more on perennial staples
like cassava, bananas and enset, in addition to traditional cash crops
such as coffee and tea (Headey et al., 2014; Jayne and Muyanga,
2013). However, the low adoption of modern technologies such as
fertilizers and seeds is well documented, as are the links between
population growth and nutrient mining in Africa. And while there
are uncertainties about the extent to which African countries have
real economic potential to scale up irrigation (see You et al., 2012,
for example), there are at least good grounds to conclude that irri-
gation will not be the low hanging fruit it was in many Asian coun-
tries. Particularly disturbing is that much of the densely populated
East African highlands have relatively little potential for large scale
irrigation. Lower rates of irrigation in Africa will, in turn, imply
lower returns to improved seed and fertilizer packages relative to
Asia, and make further increases in cropping intensity much more
difﬁcult, and potentially unsustainable over the long run.
A third difference between Asia and Africa that we have only
indirectly touched upon is the sheer diversity of agricultural pro-
duction in Africa. Agroecologically, Africa has diverse soils and cli-
mate (Voortman et al., 2000), both across countries, and within the
larger countries. Production-wise, cereals account for a smaller
share of agricultural production in Africa and there is more diver-
sity within cereals (maize, wheat, rice, sorghum, millet) relative to
rice-dominated Asia. In addition to this inherent agricultural diver-
sity, the large number of relatively small countries in Africa, along
with chronic underinvestment in agricultural research and devel-
opment (Pardey et al., 2006) as well as infrastructure (Foster,
2008), has led to the sluggish development and uptake of improved
seeds (Evenson and Gollin, 2003a,b). As Mellor argues in this issue,
Africa actually needs more R&D and infrastructure investment than
Asia precisely because of this diversity, but it has received, and
itself invested, far less.
These are obviously quite pessimistic conclusions that temper
the optimism around Africa’s recent resurgence in agriculture.
The institutional and macroeconomic environment has improved
across the board in Africa relative to the 1970s and 1980s, but in
and only a few cases have these generic improvements been
accompanied by increased public investment in agriculture. With
high and rapidly rising population densities in much of the conti-
nent, African governments clearly need more and better invest-
ment to shift their production systems onto more sustainable
intensiﬁcation paths.
Nonfarm diversiﬁcation
Whilst the work of Boserup and others has demonstrated the
importance of agricultural intensiﬁcation as an important response
to population density, that literature devoted very little attention
to diversiﬁcation out of agriculture as an alternative means of
adaptation. This omission is potentially an important one: if there
are limits to agricultural intensiﬁcation, then could nonfarm
employment and migration provide an escape route for densely
populated areas? In this section we look at a mix of fresh and exist-
ing evidence on the extent to which land pressures induces threemeans of diversifying out of agriculture: the rural nonfarm econ-
omy, the domestic urban economy, and overseas migration. Unfor-
tunately, both cross-country data and standard household surveys
are poorly suited to studying these forms of ‘‘migration’’, particu-
larly because of self-selection issues (de Brauw and Carletto,
2008). Hence, the analysis of this section is quite exploratory.
The rural non-farm economy
During the 1970s and 1980s economists increasingly realized
that rural nonfarm income and employment shares in developing
countries are large, and in some contexts even exceed agricultural
employment and income shares. This cognizance consequently led
to quite a large literature on the rural nonfarmeconomy (RNFE), par-
ticularly on the drivers and constraints to RNFE growth. The litera-
ture generally cites a number factors underlying RNFE expansion,
including agricultural productivity growth triggering demand and
supply multipliers (Mellor, 1976; Haggblade et al., 1989), indus-
try-led growth (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2004; Ghani et al., 2012),
and expansion in education and infrastructure (roads, electricity).
Nevertheless, some of the literature has referred to population den-
sity (and a related factor, road density) as a close correlate of rural
nonfarm activity, while much of the microeconomic literature on
the RNFE has identiﬁed farm sizes as a correlate of RNFE activity.
As an example of the latter, Pender et al. (2006) argue that the favor-
able market access and high agricultural potential of densely popu-
lated areas in the central Kenya and Ugandan highlands involves a
virtuous circle of farmand nonfarmactivities supporting each other,
whereas other studies ﬁnd that low road density and poor access to
major urban centers is associated with low RNFE shares. Similarly,
studies fromSouthAsia have found that populationand roaddensity
are closely associated with rural nonfarm employment shares
(Haggblade et al., 2007; Headey et al., 2011). Household surveys
often also show that farm sizes have a U-shaped relationship with
RNFE activity, with small farmers or landless people appearing to
be pushed into the RNFE, while the largest farmers use the RNFE
for positive income diversiﬁcation (Haggblade et al., 2007). This
would imply that shrinking farm sizes and emerging landlessness
would result in greatly increased demand for RNFE activities. Never-
theless the general equilibriumwelfare implications of this push are
unclear: unaccompanied by increased labor demand, the greater
supply of RNFE activity would be expected to either reduce wages
or create unemployment. Consistent with this, many of the country
case studies from this special issue ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative rela-
tionship between local population density and village wages.
As we noted above, a major obstacle to identifying these rela-
tionships is that measuring RNF employment or income in a con-
sistent way across countries is particularly problematic. In an
effort to overcome these issues we use primary employment data
from the rural components of the Demographic Health Surveys
(DHS), following Headey et al. (2010). Though the data are simplis-
tic in focusing on primary occupations only, the DHS are advanta-
geous in this regard because they are highly homogenous in their
use of survey instruments and basic survey design. Descriptive
data from this source is presented in Table 5 for men and women
in low and high density SSA countries, and in selected non-SSA
countries. While the DHS follow a common methodology, we do
note some problems with the data. For women, we observe some
sensitivity as to whether women (or survey enumerators) classify
themselves as working in sales/services (a nonfarm activity) or in
agriculture or domestic work (farm activities).16 For men, an
Table 6
Rural nonfarm employment shares for men and women in the 2000s. Sources: All data are calculated from the DHS (2012). n.a. means not available.
High density Africa Low density Africa Other LDCs
Country Women Men Country Women Men Country Women Men
Benin 50.4 23.7 Burkina Faso 12.9 8.1 Bangladesh 53.4 44.5
Congo (DRC) 14.0 23.5 Chad 13.7 9.6 Bolivia 71.4 25.9
Ethiopia 34.3 9.7 Cote d’Ivoire 31.7 22.1 Cambodia 36.0 n.a.
Kenya 47.1 37.3 Ghana 50.1 26.6 Egypt 69.4 n.a.
Madagascar 17.8 15.3 Mali 44.6 16.0 Guatemala 79.1 n.a.
Malawi 41.5 36.0 Mozambique 5.2 23.0 Haiti 24.0 19.0
Nigeria 65.5 37.0 Niger 60.2 35.8 India 22.4 n.a.
Rwanda 7.3 14.2 Senegal 63.7 37.1 Indonesia 59.2 39.5
Sierra Leone 25.2 20.1 Tanzania 7.2 10.5 Nepal 90.5 34.2
Uganda 15.5 20.3 Zambia 30.1 19.5 Philippines 16.2 42.6
17 We also tried to test these patterns somewhat more rigorously by regressing 10-
year changes in urban population shares against initial population density and initia
urbanization levels. In non-African samples higher initial densities seem to drive
urban growth, but in Africa there is no systematic effect.
D.D. Headey, T.S. Jayne / Food Policy 48 (2014) 18–33 27unemployment category presents some problems for selected coun-
tries, particularly Nigeria. And of course, income shares would be
preferable to employment shares.
Interestingly, we observe no systematic cross-sectional rela-
tionships between RNF employment shares and population den-
sity. Less than 10% of women in Rwanda and Burundi and less
than 10% of men in Ethiopia primarily work in the RNFE. However,
other large and reasonably densely populated African countries
like Nigeria, Malawi and Kenya have much larger RNFE shares.
Moreover, the correlation between male and female RNFE shares
across countries is reasonably low (0.51) and in some countries
RNF primary employment is more prevalent for women than
men, suggesting we do indeed need to analyze these indicators
separately. The pattern of results in Table 5 is consistent with
many other survey-based cross-country estimates of RNFE activity,
such as data reported in the country case studies, as well as Pender
et al. (2006), Haggblade et al. (2007) and FAO (1998).
In Table 6 we test for a density-RNFE relationship more system-
atically with multivariate regressions. Data constraints again
prevent us from using panel techniques, so our approach instead
uses a pooled regression of the panel data, with roads, electricity,
education and income per capita added as key control variables.
We also specify interactions between rural population density
and an Africa (SSA) dummy variable. In regressions 1 and 2 we
see positive but insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients for the non-Africa
women’s sample in both a parsimonious and a more expansive
model, and negative interaction terms for the African women’s
sample. However, in regression 2 the net effect of population den-
sity on RNFE shares for women is not signiﬁcantly different from
zero. In regressions 3 and 4 there are no signiﬁcant density effects
for the men’s sample in either the African or non-African samples.
Hence, in these admittedly small samples, population density does
not appear to have independent effects on RNFE shares.
In contrast, the control variables in the model do lend substan-
tial support to the existing literature on the drivers of rural non-
farm growth. Depending on the gender sample and on whether
or not agricultural output per worker is included (this variable is
highly correlated with the other control variables), we see some
signiﬁcant, positive and reasonably large elasticities for education,
road density, electricity, and agricultural output per worker. It
would therefore appear that there is no endogenous process by
which rising land constraints automatically generate rural non-
farm employment. Instead, it appears that there are speciﬁc drivers
of RNFE activity, such as infrastructure, human capital or growth
linkages from other sectors.
Migration to urban centers
Does urbanization offer a viable exit out of land-constrained
African agricultural sectors? There is considerable debate about
the potential for rural–urban migration to alleviate povertyreduction, but it is a debate poorly informed by rigorous evidence.
Rural–urban welfare comparisons consistently show that urban
areas are better off than rural areas in terms of poverty levels, mal-
nutrition, and access to education and health services (Headey
et al., 2010; Ravallion et al., 2007). Rare dynamic studies on migra-
tion in Africa also show that migration appears to be welfare-
enhancing (Beegle et al., 2008; de Brauw et al., 2013). Studies from
various continents also suggest that there may be systematic
under-investment in migration (and rural education) because of
both market failures (information asymmetries, risk aversion) and
government policies that implicitly or explicitly inhibit migration
(Bryan et al., 2012; Jensen and Miller, 2011; de Brauw et al., 2013).
However, these conclusions come with important caveats. First,
there is substantial evidence that Africa’s rapid urbanization is
overstated by UN statistics (Potts, 2012), and that urban poverty
reduction in Africa has been slower than elsewhere (Headey
et al., 2010; Ravallion et al., 2007). Second, the empirical literature
on migration and subsequent income growth in Africa seems con-
ﬁned to two studies (Beegle et al., 2008; de Brauw et al., 2013), nei-
ther of which can satisfactorily account for self-selection biases.
Third, whether migration can be successfully scaled up depends
on macroeconomic and general equilibrium factors. Africa’s perfor-
mance in manufacturing has been very poor, and manufacturing
accounts for a paltry share of national employment. Instead, much
of the employment in urban areas is in low skill-low return ser-
vices sectors, leading to what Gollin et al. (2013) term ‘‘consump-
tion cities’’ as opposed to ‘‘production cities’’.
Perhaps as a reﬂection of the more pessimistic general equilib-
rium constraints to job creation outside of agriculture, we also
observe no empirical link between rural population density and
urbanization in Africa. Nigeria and Kenya have densely populated
rural areas and large urban population shares on the order of
50%, but Ethiopia, Uganda, Malawi and Rwanda remain highly
rural, with urban population shares of 25% or less.17 Although more
urbanization in Africa is likely to be desirable (and that constraints
to migration should be removed), it will be difﬁcult to generate
remunerative urban employment without a more successful indus-
trialization process (Headey et al., 2010). Sluggish urban industrial-
ization to date may be among the leading factors explaining the
observed weak relationship between rural population density and
non-farm income in Africa.International migration
If domestic industrial or services growth is failing to create suf-
ﬁcient nonfarm employment, then overseas labor markets offer al
Table 7
Estimating elasticities between rural nonfarm employment indicators and rural population density for women and men. Sources: All variables worker are calculated from the DHS
(2012), except rural population density and agricultural output per worker, which are calculated from the FAO (2012). See Table A1 for deﬁnitions of variables.
Regression no. R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6
Sample Women Women Women Men Men Men
Population density 0.47 0.09 0.15 0.33 0.32 0.31
(0.31) (0.37) (0.32) (0.41) (0.50) (0.52)
Density  Africa 0.19** 0.22** 0.15* 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Africa dummy 0.25 0.10 0.04 0.43 0.09 0.09
(0.2) (0.23) (0.20) (0.30) (0.32) (0.33)
Secondary educ. by gender 0.03 0.11 0.35*** 0.35***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12)
Road density 0.14* 0.15** 0.17* 0.17*
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10)
Electricity 0.20** 0.07 0.09 0.09
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 0.11)
Ag. output per worker, log 0.46*** 0.01
(0.12) (0.16)
Number of observations 162 122 95 74 74 74
R-square 0.2 0.53 0.24 0.55 0.55 0.55
Standard errors are in parentheses. These are robust regressions with regional ﬁxed effects, which are not reported for the sake of brevity.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
28 D.D. Headey, T.S. Jayne / Food Policy 48 (2014) 18–33potentially important means of diversifying out of farm. Moreover,
World Bank (2012) data show that remittances to developing
countries grew by around 1600% from 1990 to 2010, and now con-
stitute a much larger source of inward ﬁnancial ﬂows than foreign
aid. But while remittances have been growing in some African
countries, they generally remain much lower than in other regions.
Senegal and Togo have remittance shares as high as the Philippines
and Bangladesh (10% of GDP), and Kenya and Nigeria also have rel-
atively large and fast-growing remittance earnings (5–6% of GDP),
as does Uganda (4% of GDP). But in all other high-density African
countries formal remittances remain below 2% of GDP (e.g.
Ethiopia, Malawi and Rwanda). Admittedly, informal remittances
constitute a signiﬁcant caveat for these statistics, especially where
there is taxation of remittances, underdeveloped ﬁnancial services,
or mistrust of governments.
In Table 7, however, we test for relationships between
remittances and population density more systematically. We use
regressions in both levels (log–log) and ﬁrst differences, and in
regressions 1 and 2 we use agricultural population density, whilst
regressions 3 and 4 use rural population density (since in this case,
the choice makes some difference). Apart from a full set of regional
and time period dummies, the only control variable that we
include is total population, since smaller countries are known to
have higher remittance ratios.18
In all the regressions the elasticity of remittances with respect
to population density in the non-Africa sample is highly signiﬁcant,
but the differenced regressions (which remove ﬁxed effects)
invariably show much larger elasticities than the levels regressions
(as well as larger standard errors). In the levels regressions the
elasticities vary between 0.25 and 0.31, while the elasticities
derived from ﬁrst differences are 0.97 for agricultural density
and 1.17 for rural density (note the larger standard errors in both
cases, however). Irrespective of magnitudes, the signiﬁcance of
these coefﬁcients is encouraging for viewing access to interna-
tional remittance earnings as an important response to rising land
pressures, but the regressions in ﬁrst differences suggest that the
remittance-density elasticity in Africa is much lower than the rest
of the sample. Moreover, remittances in African countries are much
lower than other regions. In the regressions in levels, for example,18 Note that although we tested other controls (such as infrastructure, passport
costs and travel restrictions), but these were insigniﬁcant once the population
variables were included.we observe negative coefﬁcients on all the African regional dummy
variables, except Southern Africa, where remittances from South
Africa are important. Thus, as with the results for rural nonfarm
income and urbanization, there are some signs that African popu-
lations have not yet been able to exploit overseas labor market
opportunities as well as Asian countries have.
Reducing rural fertility rates
Along with ﬁxed agricultural technologies, the inexorable
growth of rural populations in underdeveloped settings was a key
assumption ofMalthus’ originalmodel.WhilstMalthushimself sub-
sequently retracted this assumption, very little research has explic-
itly advanced the idea that households might voluntarily reduce
fertility rates in response to rising land pressures (Bilsborrow
(1987) is an exception, as is Clay and Reardon’s (1998) study of
Rwanda).
Even so, the economic analysis of fertility decisions (Becker and
Lewis, 1973; De Tray, 1973; McCabe and Rosenzweig, 1976;
Rosenzweig, 1977) provides strong expectations that fertility
reductions may be quite an important means of adapting to such
pressures. These theories advanced the notion that fertility out-
comes are largely a function of choice; namely rational appraisals
of the costs and beneﬁts of additional children. Beneﬁts include
consumption utility, the value of child labor, and informal old
age insurance that grown-up children can provide in the absence
of formal welfare systems. Amongst the costs, the majority of the-
oretical emphasis focuses on the opportunity costs of child-bearing
and rearing that women incur, such as forgone education and wage
incomes. A more demographic literature has largely accepted these
tenets, but also argues that supply side failures nevertheless create
gaps between desired and achieved fertility rates. Such failures
include lack of contraceptive knowledge and access, and female
empowerment (Kohler, 2012).
Given this general theoretic framework, the next question is
how rising land pressures might inﬂuence the cost-beneﬁt analysis
of the demand for children, as well as the supply of family planning
services. There are three important mechanisms that one would
expect to link these processes. The ﬁrst pertains to the child labor
requirements of agricultural intensiﬁcation. At one extreme, exten-
sive pastoralist and agro-pastoralist systems have high demands
for child labor and are therefore typically associated with very high
desired fertility rates (Binswanger and McIntire, 1987; Randall,
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rates are from the DHS (2012) and rural population density is from the FAO (2012).
ALBARMAZE BGDBGDBGD BGDBGD
BEN
BEN
BEN
BOLBOLL
BO
BWA
BRA
RA
BFABFA
BDI
BDI
KHM
KHM
KHM
CMR
CMRCMR
CAF
TCD
TCD
COLCOL
COLLCOL
COM
ZAR
COGCIV
CIV
DOM
DOM
DOM
DECU
ECU
SLV
SLV
ERIERI
ETH
ETH
ETH
GAB
GHA
GHA
GHA
GTM
GTM
GTMGTM
GININ
GUY
HTI
HTIHTIHND
IND
IND
IND
IDNIDNIDNIDN
IDN
IDN
KAZ
KAZ
KENKENKEN
KEN
KENKGZ
LSO
LBR
LBR
MDG
MDG
MDG
MD
MWI
MWI
MWIM I
MLI
MLI
MLIM I
MRT
MEX
MOZ
MOZ
NAM
N M
NAM
NPL
NPL
NPL
NPL
NINIC
NERNER
NER
NGA
NGA
NGANGA
PAK PAKPRY
PRY
PERPERPER
PER
PHLPHLPHL
P L
RWA
RWA
RWARWA
RWA
SEN
SENSEN
SEN
SEN
SLE
LKA
SDN
SWZ
TZ
TZA
TZA
TZA
TZA
THA
TMP
TGO
TGO
TUR
TKM
UKR
UZB
VNM VNM
ZMB
ZMB
ZMB
ZWE
ZWE
ZW
ZWE
ZWE
EGYEGYEGYEGYEGY EGY
JOR
JOR
JOR
JORJOR
MAR
AR
MARTUN
0
2
4
6
8
10
D
es
ire
d 
fe
rti
lit
y 
(#
 c
hi
ld
re
n)
0 500 1000 1500
Rural population density (person per sq km)
Full sample gradient
African sample gradient
Fig. 4. Desired rural fertility rates and rural population density. Notes: The ﬁtted
curves are based on Lowess regressions. See Table A1 for deﬁnitions. Sources:
Desired rural fertility rates are from the DHS (2012), and pertain to women aged
20–34. Rural population density is from the FAO (2012).
BEN
BEN
BEN
BFA
BFA
CMR
CMRCMR
TCD
COM
ZAR
COG
CIVERIERI
ETH
ETH
GAB
GHAGHA
GHA
GHA
GIN
GIN
KEN
KEN
KEN
LSO
LBR
MDG
MDG
MWI
MWI
MWI
MLI
MLI
MOZ
MOZ
NAMNAM
NER
NER
NER
NGA
NGANGA
NGA
RWA
RWA
RWA
SEN
SEN
SLE
TZA
TZA
TZA
TZA
TGO
ZMB
ZMB
ZMB
15
20
25
30
35
40
U
nm
et
 c
on
tra
ce
pt
io
n 
ne
ed
s 
(%
 w
om
en
)
0 100 200 300 400
Rural population density (person per sq km)
Fig. 5. Unmet contraception needs (% women) and rural population density in
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D.D. Headey, T.S. Jayne / Food Policy 48 (2014) 18–33 292008). At the other extreme the most intensive agricultural sys-
tems involve small farms and a relatively high degree of mechani-
zation, in which child labor plays a minimal role. More ambiguous
is the transition between these two extremes, since at early stages
of intensiﬁcation labor requirements are typically quite high, espe-
cially during peak seasons (Pingali et al., 1987). Moreover, labor
market failures make family labor relatively productive in compar-
ison to hired labor (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986). Thus one
might expect a non-linear relationship between agricultural
intensiﬁcation and fertility rates, with fertility rates only reducing
substantially after farm sizes fall below a certain limit, or once
labor-saving technologies are proﬁtably adopted.
A second expectation is that female labor requirements change
as population density increases. As we argue below, when farm
sizes fall below a certain threshold it becomes proﬁtable for house-
holds to allocate a portion of household labor to nonfarm activities.
Whilst female participation in the wage labor force may vary for
other reasons, rural nonfarm employment among women in devel-
oping countries is surprisingly high, and often linked with lower
fertility rates (Schultz, 1997). The emergence of labor markets also
tends to reduce fertility rates.
Finally, insofar as one would expect increased population den-
sity to be associated with greater access to fertility-reducing
health, family planning and education services, then these sup-
ply-side factors may reduce both desired and achieved fertility
rates. Female education is particularly strongly linked to fertility
outcomes (Schultz, 1997), though family planning policies have
also shown some efﬁcacy (Kohler, 2012), but less so in Africa.
These considerations lead us to test whether various achieved
and desired rural fertility rates respond to land pressures, and
whether the size of the response is comparable to other well-
known drivers of fertility rates, such as female education and
household income. Our hypotheses are tested in a model in which
rural fertility rates are a function of population density, female
education, female nonfarm employment and rural incomes.19
In Fig. 3, however, we ﬁrst plot rural fertility rates from the
Demographic Health Surveys (DHS, 2012) against rural population
density. The graph shows, at best, a very modest negative gradient,
but a large intercept difference between the African and non-Afri-
can predictions, with the former lying some two children above the
non-African sample. The relationships are also heteroskedastic,
suggesting that many other factors play a role in determining rural
fertility rates.
In Fig. 4 we instead look at desired fertility rates, an indicator
based on questions about optimal number of children, asked of
women aged 20–34. Here the results are strikingly different, at
least for the African sample. For while the relationship remains
heteroskedastic, at the lowest levels of population density in Africa
the predicted number of desired children is 6, but this drops sub-
stantially to just 4 children countries like Rwanda and Burundi.
The difference between actual and desired fertility rates (Figs. 3
and 4) is deﬁned in the demographic literature as ‘‘unmet contra-
ception needs’’ for women, which we report in Fig. 5 for an African
sub-sample. The slope is strikingly positive and steep.
These results suggest that higher rural population density may
indeed reduce desired fertility rates, but that inadequate access to
family planning services have thus far inhibited the achievement
of those fertility reductions. In Table 9 we explore these issues in
a multivariate setting by estimating log–log regressions both
realized and desired fertility rates as the two dependent variables
of interest. The regressions use regional ﬁxed effects and a
robust regressor to minimize the inﬂuence of outliers in what iscontraception needs is sourced from the DHS (2012), and pertain to women aged
20–24. Rural population density is from the FAO (2012). Unmet contraception
needs refers to who are fecund and sexually active but are not using any method of
contraception, and report not wanting any more children or wanting to delay the
birth of their next child.
19 Since population density may partly determine some of these control variables
we will also test more parsimonious models.,
Table 8
Elasticities between national remittance earnings (% GDP) and population density. Sources: Remittance data are from the World Bank (2012), while population density data are
calculated from the FAO (2012). See Table A1 for deﬁnitions of variables.
Regression no. 1 2 3 4
Estimator OLS Robust OLS Robust
Structure Levels (logs) First difference Levels (logs) First difference
Density variable Agricultural Agricultural Rural Rural
Population density 0.25*** 0.97** 0.31*** 1.17***
(0.07) (0.47) (0.07) (0.43)
Population density  Africa 0.05 0.94 0.04 1.22**
(0.08) (0.71) (0.08) (0.57)
Total population 0.24*** 1.31** 0.23*** 0.82
(0.04) (0.6) (0.04) (0.51)
Lagged remittances 0.21*** 0.24***
(0.05) (0.05)
Lagged population density 0.06 0.06
(0.04) (0.04)
West Africa dummy 0.67* 0.49
(0.36) (0.36)
Central Africa dummy 1.55*** 1.40***
(0.4) (0.4)
East Africa dummy 0.90** 0.74*
(0.39) (0.39)
Southern Africa dummy 0.14 0.24
(0.35) (0.36)
1977–87 dummy 0.15 0.12
(0.17) (0.17
1987–97 dummy 0.33* 0.09 0.28* 0.06
(0.17) (0.12) (0.16) (0.12)
1997–2007 dummy 0.79*** 0.19 0.72*** 0.24*
(0.16) (0.13) (0.16) (0.13)
Number of observations 231 147 231 159
R-square 0.39 147 0.4 0.22
Standard errors are in parentheses. Note that the levels regressions include regional effects for all regions, but for the sake of brevity only African coefﬁcients are reported.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 9
Estimating elasticities between rural fertility indicators and rural population density. Sources: Actual and desired rural fertility rates and female education are from the DHS
(2012), and pertain to women aged 20–34. Rural population density is from the FAO (2012). See Table A1 for deﬁnitions.
Regression number 1 2 3 4
Dependent variable Actual fertility Actual fertility Desired fertility Desired fertility
Model Linear Log–log Linear Log–log
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Population density (per 100 m2) 0.14*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.00
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Density  Africa 0.05 0.09*** 0.34*** 0.07***
(0.10) (0.03) (0.10) (0.02)
Female secondary education (%) 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.01** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Ag. output per worker, log 0.58*** 0.13*** 0.01 0.06***
(0.13) (0.03) (0.12) (0.02)
Africa dummy 1.25*** 0.15 2.13*** 0.67***
(0.3) (0.15) (0.29) (0.12)
South Asia dummy 0.32 0.05 0.43 0.12**
(0.34) (0.08) (0.33) (0.06)
MENA dummy 1.15*** 0.25*** 0.06 0.05
(0.41) (0.09) (0.40) (0.07)
E. Europe, C. Asia 0.24 0.40*** 0.71* 0.17**
(0.42) (0.10) (0.41) (0.07)
L. America, Caribbean 0.72** 0.11 0.59** 0.12**
(0.31) (0.08) (0.30) (0.06)
Muslim dummy 0.55*** 0.07 0.84*** 0.12***
(0.20) (0.05) (0.20) (0.04)
Number of observations 165 165 164 164
R-square 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.81
Standard errors are in parentheses. These are robust regressions.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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D.D. Headey, T.S. Jayne / Food Policy 48 (2014) 18–33 31a relatively small sample,20 but as above we always introduce inter-
action terms with an African dummy to test if adaptation processes
are somehow different. We also estimate both linear models and
log–log models.
In regressions 1 and 2 in Table 9 we regress actual fertility rates
against our control variables. Although Fig. 2 did not givemuch sug-
gestion of a signiﬁcant negative gradient, the addition of control
variables suggests that, in the non-African sample at least, higher
population density is signiﬁcantly associated with lower fertility
rates. The marginal effect is fairly small, however. An increase of
100 people per square km is predicted to introduce a fertility reduc-
tion of 0.14 children (or in percentage terms, the elasticity is just
0.09). Moreover, population density seems unassociated with
actual fertility rates in the African sample, consistent with Fig. 2.
In regressions 3 and 4 however, we see that higher population
densities in Africa are quite strongly associated with lower desired
fertility rates, and the marginal effect is quite large (consistent
with Figs. 3 and 4). A 100 person increase in population density
predicts a 0.45 child reduction in desired fertility in Africa. In per-
centage terms (regression 4) the elasticity appears fairly modest
(0.07). However, not only is the density elasticity highly signiﬁ-
cant, the results in Table 8 also suggest it is commensurate in size
to other well-known determinants of fertility such as female edu-
cation and income.21
These ﬁndings potentially strong policy implications inasmuch
as they indicatively suggests that governments in high density
African countries should consider focusing more resources on fam-
ily planning, given the greater unmet demand for these services
(by women at least) in land-constrained settings. The impact of
family planning interventions in developing countries has been
much disputed (see Kohler, 2012 for a review), though the eco-
nomic beneﬁts of reducing fertility rates are well established
(Bloom et al., 2007; Bloom and Williamson, 1998). One source of
pessimism with respect to family planning interventions is that
they are likely to be ineffective when there is no latent demand
for contraception. In the case of high density countries in Africa,
however, our results suggest that there is indeed substantial
demand for family planning services, at least among the female
population.22 Further discussion of the policy implications of this paper and the other papers in
the special issue can be found in the concluding article of the issue, by Jayne et al
(2014).
23 Explaining these outcomes is well beyond the scope of this current paper, but weConclusions
This paper has explored the means and magnitudes by which
rural populations, and their governments, adapt to rising land pres-
sures, with a particular focus on whether Africa’s adaptations to
land pressures systematically differ from those of other developing
regions, especially Asia. Whilst very much building on an existing
literature, our approach has departed from that literature in two
ways. First, our theoretical framework went beyond Boserupian
intensiﬁcation of agriculture to focus on fertility changes and
‘‘migration’’ into nonfarm sectors as two other potentially impor-
tant means of responding to land constraints. Second, rather than
using household or village survey data, we focused on cross-
country evidence. While this ambitious approach comes with a
number of caveats related to aggregation issues, measurement
error, misspeciﬁcation problems, and endogeneity biases, some
reasonably ﬁrm conclusions can be drawn from our results (though
many undoubtedly warrant more research). In this concluding20 This small sample and more limited time span of the DHS (most of which were
conducted in the last 15 years or so) imply that estimating country ﬁxed effects
models may be unwise given that population density and other control variables wil
have changed very little over this period. When we did run ﬁxed effects, the results
were qualitatively similar (same signs), but the coefﬁcients were implausibly large.
21 These results are also highly robust to measuring desired fertility rates for
different age groups and to different speciﬁcations.
have at least made note of the usual suspects (lack of education and infrastructure
and the poor performance of the industrial sector).
24 Indeed, the Prime Ministers of Rwanda and Ethiopia recently published an
editorial in a special issue of The Lancet in which they place family planning initiatives
as an important priority for their governments (Habumuremyi and Zenawi, 2012). On
the other hand, President Museveni of Uganda called the country’s population growth
– which is the fastest in the world – ‘‘a great resource’’, and argues that developmen
itself will sufﬁce to reduce population growth, rather than vice versa.lsection we brieﬂy summarize these conclusions, and draw out
some key policy implications of our ﬁndings.22
First, consistent with Boserup and others, we do ﬁnd evidence
that agricultural intensiﬁcation is an important means of adapting
to shrinking farm sizes, but that intensiﬁcation can follow very dif-
ferent paths. For both Asia and Africa it is clear that higher density
countries have more intensive agricultural systems irrespective of
which period is examined. Yet over the period 1977–2007 we ﬁnd
very different intensiﬁcation paths in these two regions. In Asia,
yields grew rapidly, partly as a result of Green Revolution invest-
ments, but also in response to rising land constraints (Table 5).
In Africa, we observe no response of yields to land constraints over
the short run, nor any growth of modern inputs such as fertilizers
or irrigation. Instead, we observe increased cropping intensity
driving around half of the growth in total crop output per hectare.
This would appear to be an unsustainable intensiﬁcation path
given the implied mining of nutrients, and the more limited pros-
pects for low cost irrigation investments, at least in many high
density African countries.
Second, while nonfarm employment is a potentially very impor-
tant avenue for adapting to land constraints, its relationship with
rural population density to date appears to be very weak. Our anal-
ysis of this issue was necessarily very exploratory given immense
data constraints on each of the three forms of diversiﬁcationwe ana-
lyzed. Nevertheless, a quite consistent picture emerges from this
qualiﬁed exploration of the available data: rural Africa is not doing
well at diversifying out of agriculture, particularly those densely
populated rural areas that are in greatest need of nonfarm diversiﬁ-
cation. Relative to their lowdensitypeers, highdensityAfricancoun-
tries are no more likely to have high rural nonfarm employment
shares, nomore likely toexperience fasterurbanization, andnomore
likely to have larger remittance earnings.23 Third, we found strong
evidence that population density is strongly and negatively correlated
with desired fertility rates (particularly in Africa), but not with
achieved fertility outcomes. Though this result is, to the best of our
knowledge, quite novel, it is nevertheless consistent both with eco-
nomic theories of purposive fertility decisions, andwith demographic
theories that emphasize the importance of proactive family planning
policies. From a policy perspective, the unmet demand for contracep-
tion in more densely populated areas suggests there is underinvest-
ment in family planning in these countries. Whether this is really
the case depends on the costs and beneﬁts of family planning. With
regard to beneﬁts, lower fertility rates would gradually alleviate land
pressures, but reduced fertility rates have also been linked to reduc-
tions in poverty and substantial improvements in maternal and child
health andnutrition, and faster economic growth (Cleland et al., 2012;
Eastwood and Lipton, 2004; Bloom andWilliamson, 1998). On amore
positive front, several high-density African countries have indeed
scaled up family planning efforts in recent years – seemingly to some
effect (Pörtner et al., 2012) – and several African leaders seem to have
started prioritizing family planning in their development agendas (as
well as related investments, such as female education).24
Finally, one implication of our ﬁndings is the need for some
serious reappraisal of land issues in Africa. Standard agricultural.
,
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Table A1
Deﬁnitions of key variables used in this study. Sources: Unmet contraception needs is sourced from the DHS (2012), and pertain to women aged 20–24. Rural population density is
from the FAO (2012). Unmet contraception needs refers to who are fecund and sexually active but are not using any method of contraception, and report not wanting any more
children or wanting to delay the birth of their next child.
Short variable name (sources) Deﬁnition
FAO variables
Agricultural population density Population estimated to be primarily dependent upon agriculture divided by agricultural land, which is the sum of arable
crops, permanent crops and permanent pastures
Rural population density The population estimated to be rural divided by agricultural land
Rural population per hectare of suitable
crop land (FAO, IIASA)
This is the rural population relative to the area estimated to possess some suitability for agricultural production
Agricultural output Value of total agricultural production in 2005 international dollars, net of fee and seed inputs, divided by crop land
Crop output Value of total crop production in 2005 international dollars, net of feed and seed inputs, divided by crop land
Cereal yields Volume of cereal production in rice milled equivalent divided by total cereal area
Crop intensity Area harvested to in a year (including multiple harvests) divided by temporary crop area harvested at least once in the
last 5 years. Table 4 uses only cereal area in the numerator; Table 5 uses all crop area in the numerator
Non-cereal output Value of non-cereal output (net of seeds) per hectare of crop land, in 2005 international dollars
Non-food output (%) Value of non-food products as a percentage of total agricultural output (used to examine non-food cash crops)
Non-land capital As above, but excluding land capital (which includes irrigation)
Cattle/oxen per hectare Number of head of cattle, oxen and buffalo relative to total crop land. This is a proxy for animal traction & dairy
Nitrogen per ha Nitrogen (kg of N nutrients) per hectare
Irrigation (%) Percentage of crop land irrigated
Agric. output per worker Value of total agricultural production in 2005 international dollars per agricultural worker
DHS variables
Fertility rate (DHS) This is the total fertility rate, or the average number of children born to a women over her lifespan
Desired fertility rate (DHS) This is the number of children a woman aged 20–24 would ideally like to have over lifespan
Rural nonfarm employment share (DHS),
men and women
This is the percent of men or women reporting nonfarm occupations as their primary form of employment. ‘‘Farm
employment’’ includes domestic work, and the unemployed are excluded from the numerator and the denominator
Secondary education, by gender The percentage of adult men and women have attended secondary school
Electricity (%) Percentage of households reporting access to electricity
World Bank
Remittances as% of GDP (WB) Net remittances received as a% of GDP
Notes: Data sources are FAO (2012), FAO-IIASA (2009), DHS (2012), and World Bank (20
32 D.D. Headey, T.S. Jayne / Food Policy 48 (2014) 18–33development strategies in Africa are heavily focused on other
inputs (seeds, fertilizers, water), with very little emphasis on land
issues outside of the literature on land governance (see Holden and
Otsuka, and Deininger, both in this issue). Yet even setting aside
possibilities for land expansion or redistribution, appropriate rural
development strategies very much depend on what smallholders
can achieve, given land and other resource constraints. In situations
in which land constraints are binding, achieving much higher
returns to household labor may require a coordinated agricultural
intensiﬁcation strategy and industrialization policy that induces
rural–urban migration into productive non-farm sectors. This
raises many questions. To what extent can yields and cropping
intensity be increased on very small and mostly rainfed farms?
Should policies instead focus more effort on high value crops and
the value chains that support them? Or are their simply higher
returns to getting young Africans out of agriculture, through edu-
cation and other nonfarm investments?
These are issues that ought to be central to the appropriate
design of development strategies and policy experiments in land
constrained African countries. Yet if anything Africa’s apparent
land abundance at a continental scale appears to have fomented
a neglect of the seriousness of land constraints in high density
Africa, and the important consequences of these constraints for
this region’s development. Indeed, it is striking that in land-scarce
South Asia the research and policy narratives are heavily focused
on landlessness as a key dimension of poverty, while these terms
are all but absent from most policy discussions in African coun-
tries, even in regions where many farms are inadequately small
and landlessness already exists, is growing rapidly, or is likely to
do so in the near future.Appendix
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